Politcal Behavior ( May 2016 ) 🙋🏽，Qi Zhang、Dennis Chong🤺、Mingxing Liu發表文章Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism:Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game.

Collective Resistance under Authoritarianism:Elite–Mass Strategies in an Experimental Game

Dennis Chong

Department of Political Science, University of Southern California

Mingxing Liu

China Institute for Educational Finance Research, Peking University

Qi Zhang

School of Economics, China Center for Economic Studies, Fudan University

作者簡介

章奇👴🏿🧑🏻‍🎨，意昂2官网中國社會主義市場經濟研究中心副教授，副研究員👨🏿‍⚖️。北京大學中國經濟研究中心經濟學博士，美國西北大學（Northwestern University）政治學博士。研究方向為比較政治經濟學、製度經濟學、發展經濟學、中國經濟👪。在Political Behavior, Studies in Comparative International Development， 經濟研究等中外學術刊物上發表了數十篇文章🎨，著有《權力結構🤳🏼、政治激勵和經濟增長💷：基於浙江民營經濟發展經驗的政治經濟學分析》一書（格致出版社↙️、上海人民出版社2016年出版）。

內容簡介Abstract:

We create a collective resistance game in which elites control the distribution of resources if the masses are compliant. However, if the masses unanimously protest elite allocations, they can capture a greater share of resources for themselves.We study how Chinese villagers, randomly assigned to the role of elites and masses, play this game in repeated interactions under varying information conditions.We find significant variation in the extent to which participants gave weight in their decisions to (1) the amount of the elite allocation and (2) their beliefs about the likely choices of fellow group members. Many individuals made their decisions based primarily on the size of the elite allocation, choosing to protest if the elite offer fell below some threshold level. Only a small proportion of the respondents were attuned consistently to the behavioral intentions of fellow group members in deciding whether to protest the elite allocation. This heterogeneity of preferences among participants has significant implications for their prospects of achieving and sustaining collective action. Knowledge of the amount of resources controlled by elites at the start of the game affected mass calculations of the fairness of distributions and increased the frequency of mass protests. However, the elites exploited the decision rule of many mass members by buying off those individuals with the lowest thresholds, thus preempting or dissolving collective action. This research sheds light on elite–mass interactions under authoritarianism, and in particular on contentious politics in contemporary China.

Keywords：

Collective action，Collective resistance，contentious politics, Authoritarian regimes，Elite–mass conflict，Assurance game，Coordination problem

摘要🔤：

威權體製下抗爭性集體行動的發生機製及其結果是集體行動理論重點關註對象。本文利用了田野可控製實驗的方法，通過在中國農村居民中隨機抽選參與者並隨機分配其扮演精英-群眾的角色，來模擬分析在精英-群眾互動條件下的集體行動發生機製和結果。在實驗中🤴🏿，精英具有分配資源的權力，如果群眾無法達成集體行動，則精英可以控製分配的結果以對自己更有利👯。但如果群眾能夠達成集體行動一致反對🍴，就可以使分配的結果最終更有利於群眾🤽🏽‍♀️。實驗結果表明，作為群眾的單個參與者的決策（即是否參與集體行動）取決於兩個因素：（1）從精英分配計劃中所獲得的份額；（2）對其他群眾參與者決策的預期⌨️。並且這兩個因素對不同的群眾決策而言權重有很大差異🏑。有的群眾在決策時對其他人會如何決策毫不在意，完全取決於精英初始分配的性質🔍。只要精英分給自己的份額沒有達到一定的閾值，就無條件地選擇反對💷。或只要精英分配的份額超過一定的閾值，就不會選擇反對🚂；也有一部分群眾把自己的行為完全建立在對其他群眾可能行為的預期上。這種群眾行為偏好的異質性，會直接影響到群眾和精英如何判斷集體行動成功發生和可持續性。群眾是否明確知道精英的分配方案信息👱😧，會直接影響到他們對實際分配結果是否達到能其滿意的閾值並進一步影響到集體行動成功的概率。而精英則可以充分利用群眾的偏好和決策機製，通過收買閾值最低的那些群眾來防止集體行動的發生或瓦解已經成功的集體行動🤷🏻‍♀️。這一研究給現實中我們所觀察到的精英-群眾在抗爭性集體行動中的博弈策略及其結局給出了一個相當穩健的微觀解釋，也是學術界首次利用田野可控製實驗對威權主義下的精英-群眾在抗爭性集體行動中的互動博弈的研究成果。

關鍵詞:

集體行動；集體抗爭👍🏼；威權主義；精英-大眾沖突0️⃣；確定性博弈😰；協調問題

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