張軍教授在世界著名思想評論平臺網Project Syndicate撰文“China's Accelerating Fertility Crisis”，並獲China Daily轉載（題目改為“Economies Need to Rein in Population Risks”）⏯。特將此文翻譯為中文，以饗讀者。
作者 | 張軍意昂2官网文科資深教授、意昂2平台院長👣、中國社會主義市場經濟研究中心主任𓀖，上海國際金融與經濟研究院理事
從歷史角度看☂️💖，人口數量一直是一個緩慢變動的變量。但是🐈⬛⛹🏻，東亞經濟體——特別是中國、日本和韓國——從人口快速增長轉為下降的變化過於迅速，以至於這些經濟體實際上出現嚴重問題。
在改革開放前，作為一個計劃經濟體，中國曾經執著地追求擴大人口數量。但是🧊，1957年，經濟學家馬寅初發表了《新人口論》並告誡人們，人口快速增長會很快妨礙中國經濟發展。盡管政府最初批評馬寅初的理論🐻❄️，但是中國領導層最終接納了他的警示，開始以鼓勵計劃生育的方式促進經濟增長。
1973年，中國更進一步，在全國推行“晚👌🏻、稀、少”（“晚結婚🧑🦼，拉長生育間隔，少生孩子”）運動，由此鼓勵一對夫妻最多只生育2個孩子。6年後，這一運動轉變為獨生子女政策👷🏻。為保證獨生子女政策的影響力🧗♀️，計劃生育在1982年被寫入中國憲法。
生育率銳減🫲🏿。到20世紀80年代中期，總和生育率只是略高於所說的人口替代率2.1這一水平，而60、70年代的生育率曾達到6.0。到90年代，生育率下降到只有1.2-1.3——這一水平註定會顯著加速中國人口老齡化。然而👨❤️💋👨，政府繼續執行獨生子女政策🌺，直到2016年才實施全面二孩政策。
由此，中國生育率有些許回升，國家統計局的數據表明，生育率在2017年達到1.58🚶♀️➡️。但這之後🎸，生育率又開始下滑，從2018年的1.49降至2019年的1.47。根據人口經濟學家梁建章估計🚣🏿♂️，生育率很可能重回90年代水平。
據梁建章的說法，2017年的總和生育率為1.58，其中0.67的生育率來自一孩家庭😂，0.81來自二孩家庭🦀，0.11來自三孩（或有更多孩子的）家庭。二孩家庭的生育率高於一孩家庭的水平，這一事實反映出二孩“堆積效應”——也就是說，有的一孩家庭🥄🧙♂️，原本就打算生育二孩，在全面二孩政策出臺後，他們才終於能生育二孩。無需多長時間，這種政策效應就會消弭，由此⛹️💏，總和生育率會迅速降至1.2,讓中國落到韓國和新加坡的水平，並很可能低於美國水平。
梁建章的觀點得到了印證，2016年以前的出生趨勢確實如此。2010年👰🏼♀️，一孩出生率為0.73🔉𓀔。雖然這一數字在2011到2013年間略有上升🧙🏽♂️，但還是在2014年降至0.72,2015年降到0.56。考慮到生育一孩一直是允許的，那麽絕大多數一孩出生後都會登記，這意味著一孩家庭的總和生育率不大可能被低估🂠。
總體看，在過去10年🦵🏼🧑🏻🎨，中國每年出生不到1800萬人⤴️，這與高峰年份2500萬到3000萬的年出生人口形成鮮明反差⛹🏽♂️。2019年，中國只登記了1.465億新生兒。2020年𓀝，這一數字降至1.003億——與上年同比下降了15%。盡管2020年的這種新生兒數量大幅度下降可能反映了新冠肺炎大流行的影響，但這一下行態勢是清晰的。
中國生育率快速下降反映出計劃生育政策的後遺症👷🏼♀️。並且，這些問題還源於快速且持續的城市化🥃👫🏼、普及教育以及經濟發展——眾所周知，這些因素會促使出生率顯著下降🪸。
日本正是這樣的例子。日本崛起到先進經濟體階段後，該國生育率大幅下降📁。然而，1995年，出生率跌至1.5以下👊🏻🙃。10年後🈯️，出生率到了1.26。隨後🦨，政策開始鼓勵生育，幫助提升了生育率😺，但是只升到1.4，這一水平保持到今天。
韓國做得更糟。盡管韓國政府一直鼓勵人們多生育，但是該國生育率在2017-18年徘徊在1.0左右，去年則降到0.84——這是世界最低水平。
與日本一樣，韓國的低生育率很大程度上能歸因於經濟因素。快速增長和大規模城市化抬高了住房🧛♀️、教育和醫療成本，此時，夫妻更不想要孩子。這意味著嚴峻的風險，快速上升的老年人口撫養比僅僅是一個開始🤗👨🏽🍳。
在中國，勞動年齡人口在過去10年每年減少約340萬🥡。今天進入勞動力市場的人🌛，在他們大部分出生的時候，生育率已經低於更替水平了。並且，隨著預期壽命的上升🤢，中國的老年人口（60歲及以上）占總人口比重，從2005年的10.45%上升到2013年的14.7%，到2019年達到18.1%。今天🙇🏿♀️⬇️，中國的老年人口比兒童（15歲及以下）更多。到2050年，中國的老年人口預計會大概翻一番👩🏼🚀，從今天的2.54億達到差不多5億🤽🏼♀️。
由於勞動力參與水平下降了♛，這些趨勢就會顯著地妨礙中國經濟的潛在產出增長🙋🏽，並給公共預算帶來巨大壓力，因為養老金和社會保障支出遠遠超出個人所得稅總收入🏊🏽。這種情況已經並正發生在日本與韓國。
中國總是對放松計劃生育規定保持謹慎🤱。但是🥘，如果中國要在未來幾十年中保持自身經濟活力，就必須努力擴大勞動力規模，包括延遲退休年齡、鼓勵家庭多生育🥕。否則🥋，中國人口會像美國作家海明威描述的那樣“慢慢地🤙🏿，然後一瞬間”變老⏪。
（作者感謝上海國際金融與經濟研究院“後新冠時期中國經濟的轉型與增長路徑👨🏻🎓：新條件與新機遇”課題為本研究提供的資助）
英文版
Economies need to rein in population risks
Editor's Note: Aging populations have far-reaching impacts on East Asian economies. In particular, China faces some serious demographic challenges. What should China do to overcome those challenges? Three experts share their views on the issue with China Daily.
Historically, demographics have been a slow-moving variable. But the East Asian economies－especially China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea－have flipped so fast from rapid population growth to decline that they practically have whiplash.
As a planned economy, China was once obsessed with expanding its population. But, in 1957, economist Ma Yinchu published The New Theory of Population and cautioned that this trend would soon begin to undermine China's economic development. Though the government initially criticized his theory, Chinese leaders eventually took his warnings to heart, encouraging family planning as a way to promote economic growth.
In 1973, China went a step further, with the national wan, xi, shao ("late marriage, longer spacing, and fewer children") campaign, which encouraged couples to have no more than two children. Six years later, this changed into the one-child policy. To ensure its long-term impact, family planning was finally written into China's Constitution in 1982.
The fertility rate plummeted. By the mid-1980s, it hovered above the so-called substitution level of 2.1, compared with 6.0 in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1990s, the fertility rate fell to just 1.2-1.3－a level that promised to hasten the country's demographic aging significantly. The government nonetheless continued to enforce the one-child policy until 2016, when it allowed all couples to have two children.
With that, China's fertility rate bounced back somewhat, reaching 1.58 in 2017, according to the National Bureau of Statistics. But it is back on a downward slide, falling from 1.49 in 2018 to 1.47 in 2019. According to population economist James Liang, it may be set to return to the 1990s levels.
As Liang said, in 2017, the total fertility rate of 1.58 reflected a fertility rate of 0.67 for one-child families, 0.81 for two-child families, and 0.11 for three-child families. The fact that the fertility rate of two-child families is higher than that of one-child families reflects the two-child "accumulation effect"－that is, one-child families that had previously wanted to have a second child finally being able to have one. Before long, that effect will dissipate, and the total fertility rate will quickly drop to 1.2, putting China in the same position as the ROK and Singapore, and possibly behind the United States.
This view is supported by pre-2016 birth trends. In 2010, the one-child birth rate stood at 0.73. While it increased slightly in 2011-13, it fell to 0.72 in 2014 and 0.56 in 2015. Given that one child was always allowed, the vast majority would have been registered, meaning that these fertility rate figures for one-child families are unlikely to be underestimates.
Overall, there have been fewer than 18 million births annually over the last decade, compared with 25-30 million during the peak years. In 2019, China registered only 14.65 million newborns. Last year, that figure dropped to 10.03 million－a year-on-year decline of nearly 15 percent. Although the sharp decline in births in 2020 might reflect the impact of the novel coronavirus pandemic, the downward trend is clear.
China's rapidly declining fertility reflects the legacy of family planning policies. They are also increasingly driven by rapid, sustained urbanization, universal education, and economic development－factors that are known to contribute to significant declines in birth rates.
This was certainly the case in Japan, whose rise to advanced economy status was followed by a sharp drop in fertility. In 1995, however, the birth rate dropped below 1.5. A decade later, it stood at 1.26. Policies to encourage childbirth subsequently helped increase the fertility rate, but only to 1.4, where it remains today.
The ROK is doing even worse. Although the ROK authorities have tried to encourage people to have more children, the country's fertility rate hovered around 1.0 in 2017-18, before dropping to 0.84 last year－the world's lowest.
As is true in Japan, the ROK's low fertility rate can be explained largely by economic factors. With rapid growth and large-scale urbanization driving up housing, education and health-care costs, couples are less willing to have children. This implies serious risks, beginning with a rapidly growing old-age dependency ratio.
In China, the working-age population has shrunk by some 3.4 million per year over the last decade. Those who are joining the workforce today were largely born when the fertility rate was already below the replacement level. And with life expectancy increasing, the share of China's elderly population (aged 60 or above) increased from 10.45 percent in 2005 to 14.7 percent in 2013, and to 18.1 percent in 2019. Today, there are more elderly people in China than children (aged 15 years or below). And by 2050, the number of elderly in China is expected to nearly double, from 254 million today to almost 500 million.
These trends will significantly undermine the potential output growth of the Chinese economy, owing to decreased labor force participation, and put tremendous pressure on public budgets, as outlays for pensions and social security far exceed income payroll-tax revenues. This is already happening in both Japan and the ROK.
China has always been cautious about loosening family planning rules. But if it is to sustain its economic dynamism in the decades to come, it must work hard to expand its labor force, including by raising the retirement age and encouraging families to have more children. Otherwise, its population will become old in the same way Ernest Hemingway described.
By Zhang Jun, Dean and professor of economics at Fudan University, Vice Dean of Fudan Development Institute, Director of the China Center for Economic Studies.
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